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Minority Shareholders "  ghts in the Close Corporation Under
the New North Carolina Business Corporation Act
The new North Carolina Business Corporation Act1 has changed the judi-
cial aid available to a close-corporation minority shareholder who is attempting
to protect his rights and interests in the corporation fron interference by a ma-
jority shareholder. 2 Specifically, the new Act has modified former sections 55-
125(a) 3 and 55-125.1, 4 which provided for dissolution and other judicial reme-
dies when necessary to protect the rights and interests of a minority shareholder.
A close corporation is typically a corporation owned and managed by a
small group of shareholders5 whose shares are not traded on the public securities
market.6 Close corporations classically include family corporations, small corpo-
rations operated like partnerships, and corporations in which the shareholders
are the managers. 7 The management of a close corporation follows the typical
pattern of corporate management: the holders of a majority of voting shares
control the corporation.8 Owners holding a majority of shares have the power to
elect all of the directors, or in the case of cumulative voting, at least a majority
of the directors. 9 The directors usually are responsive to the shareholders who
elected them; in a closely held corporation the majority shareholders usually
elect themselves and their relatives as directors.10 Through the board of direc-
tors, the majority shareholders can determine corporate policies, select officers
and employees, and supervise the normal functions of the corporation. 1
Under this method of corporate control, the majority shareholders can de-
prive a minority shareholder of any input in the operation of the business, as
well as deny him employment.' 2 Because the typical shareholder in a closely
held corporation usually expects to receive income from the corporation in the
form of a salary rather than through dividends, denying a minority shareholder
employment often deprives the minority shareholder of his principal source of
income.' 3 The majority shareholder can further deny the minority shareholder
income by refusing to declare any dividends.
1. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-1-01 to 55-17-05 (1990).
2. See id. §§ 55-14-30 to 55-14-33.
3. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-125(a) (1982) (replaced by N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-14-30 (1990)).
4. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-125.1 (1982) (replaced by N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-14-30, 55-14-31
(1990)).
5. See Darvin v. Belmont Indus., 40 Mich. App. 672, 677, 199 N.W.2d 542, 544 (1972).
6. Latty, The Close Corporation and the New North Carolina Business Corporation Act, 34
N.C.L. REv. 432, 438-39 (1956).
7. F.H. O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON, O'NEAL'S CLOSE CORPORATIONS § 1.02 (3d ed. 1988)
[hereinafter O'NEAL'S CLOSE CORPORATIONS].
8. F.H. O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON, O'NEAL'S OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS





13. O'NEAL's CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note 7, ch. 1, § 1.07, at 25.
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In addition, shareholders in a closely held corporation often have difficulty
withdrawing their investment. Because close-corporation stock usually is not
listed on a stock exchange or actively traded by brokers, there rarely exists a
ready market for close-corporation shares. 14 Because there are few sales of these
close-corporation shares, and therefore no established market price, valuation is
difficult.' 5 As a result, shareholders may have trouble selling their shares, or
may be able to do so only at a great loss.' 6 The minority share is especially
difficult to sell, as few buyers are willing to step into the shoes of the minority
shareholder who has had problems with a majority shareholder.' 7
State legislatures have recognized that minority shareholders in a close cor-
poration have no easy way to guarantee income from the corporation or to re-
cover their investment, so they have designed statutes that respond to the special
situation of the close corporation.' 8 The North Carolina legislature first pro-
vided for the minority shareholder in the close corporation by enacting North
Carolina General Statutes section 55-125(a)(4), 19 the old dissolution section, and
later enacting section 55-125.1,20 the old alternative remedy section. Section 55-
125(a)(4) authorized courts to dissolve a corporation when reasonably necessary
to protect the "rights or interests of the complaining shareholder.' '2 1" Section 55-
125.1 gave courts discretion to grant relief other than dissolution in an action
brought by a shareholder for involuntary dissolution. 22
In July 1990 the new North Carolina Business Corporation Act became
effective. The new Act incorporates the provisions of the old dissolution sec-
tion 23 but does not incorporate the old alternative relief section. This Note will
discuss these provisions of the old and new Business Corporation Acts and pre-
14. O'NEAL'S OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS, supra note 8, at § 2.15.
15. O'NEAL's CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note 7, ch. 1, § 1.07, at 26-27.
16. In re Estate of Block, 186 Misc. 945, 949, 60 N.Y.S.2d 639, 642 (Surr. Ct. 1946). "[I]n view
of the nature of the shares themselves, being those of a closely held corporation, having no general
market and not saleable to the general public in the usual manner, it would be extremely difficult if
not impossible to obtain a ready buyer for the shares." Id.
17. See O'NEAL's CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note 7, ch. 1, § 1.07, at 27.
18. Id. ch. 1, § 1.14.
19. Act of May 26, 1955, ch. 1371, § 1, 1955 N.C. Sess. Laws 1509 (codified as amended at
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-125(a)(4) (1982) and replaced by N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-14-30 (1990)). In
1955, § 55-125(a)(4) was enacted in recognition of the need for more liberal allowance of dissolution
in the case of close corporations. R. ROBINSON, NORTH CAROLINA CORPORATION LAW AND
PRACTICE, § 29-11 (3d ed. 1983).
20. Act of May 14, 1973, ch. 469, § 41, 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws 557 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 55-125.1 (1982) and replaced by N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-14-30, 55-14-31 (1990)).
21. Act of May 26, 1955, ch. 1371, § 1, 1955 N.C. Sess. Laws 1509 (codified as amended at
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-125(a)(4) (1982) and replaced by N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-14-30 (1990)). The
other provisions of § 55-125(a) provide for court-ordered dissolution in the case of director deadlock,
shareholder deadlock, or pursuant to an existing shareholder agreement. Id.
22. Act of May 14, 1973, ch. 469, § 41, 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws 557 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 55-125.1 (1982) and replaced by N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-14-30, 55-14-31 (1990)). Section 55-125.1
allowed a court to grant discretionary remedies including, but not limited to: (1) cancelling or alter-
ing charter or bylaw provisions; (2) cancelling, altering, or enjoining corporate resolutions or acts;
(3) directing or prohibiting acts of the corporation, shareholders, directors, officers, or other persons
party to the action; or (4) providing for the fair-value purchase of the shares of any shareholder by
the corporation or any other shareholder. Id.
23. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-14-30, 55-14-31 (1990).
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dict how the new provision will affect closely held corporations in North Caro-
lina. The Note concludes that, under the new Act, courts will continue to apply
the "reasonable expectations" test voiced by the North Carolina Supreme Court
in Meiselman v. Meiselman.24 Although the test for relief will not change, the
narrower range of available remedies will work a substantial change in the law.25
Under the old dissolution section, courts had the power to grant relief when
relief of some kind, but not dissolution, was reasonably necessary to protect the
complaining shareholder's rights and interests. 26 This Note argues that, because
the alternative relief measures will no longer be available, courts can grant relief
under the new dissolution section and Meiselman only when dissolution is rea-
sonably necessary to protect the complaining shareholder's rights and interests.
When the old North Carolina Business Corporation Act was drafted, there
was a "feeling, among commentators, that, notwithstanding express statutory
authorization, some courts had been too hesitant to order involuntary dissolu-
tion, especially in the case of close corporations." 27 In response to the desire for
more flexible use of judicial dissolution, the North Carolina General Assembly
adopted language from a California statute28 that gave courts wide authority to
grant involuntary dissolution in appropriate situations.29 The result was North
Carolina General Statute section 55-125(a)(4), the old dissolution section, which
empowered courts to dissolve a corporation when it was reasonably necessary to
protect the complaining shareholder's rights and interests. 30
In order to provide alternatives to the severe remedy of involuntary dissolu-
tion, the general assembly later enacted North Carolina General Statute section
55-125.1, the old alternative remedy section, giving the court broad discretion to
order remedies other than dissolution. 31 In drafting this section, the Business
24. 309 N.C. 279, 307 S.E.2d 551 (1983). For a discussion of Meiselman, see generally Note,
Corporation Law-Meiselnan v. Meiselman" "Reasonable Expectations" Determine Minority Share-
holders' Rights, 62 N.C.L. Rav. 999 (1984) (analyzing Meiselman and concluding that the Meisel-
man reasonable expectations test falls short of protecting minority shareholders from a "squeeze-
out"). The Meiselman court based its reasonable expectations test, which allowed relief based upon
the protection of reasonable rights and interests, on the language in the old dissolution section, § 55-
125(a)(4). Meiselman, 309 N.C. at 297-98, 307 S.E.2d at 562. The new Act includes verbatim the
§ 55-125(a)(4) language that authorized courts to dissolve a corporation when "reasonably neces-
sary" to protect the "rights or interests of the complaining shareholder." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-14-
30(2)(ii) (1990). For a further discussion of Meiselman, see infra notes 36-65 and accompanying
text.
25. See infra note 133 and accompanying text.
26. See Meiselman, 309 N.C. at 300-01, 307 S.E.2d at 563-64. The Meiselman opinion stated
that § 55-125(a)(4) and § 55-125.1 should be read in conjunction. Id. at 300-01, 307 S.E.2d at 563-
64. To read § 55-125(a)(4) as providing relief only when liquidation was necessary would be to deny
the existence of § 55-125.1. Id.
27. R. ROBINSON, supra note 19, at § 29-12.
28. CAL. CORP. CODE ANN. § 4650(f) (1955) (current version at CAL CORP. CODE ANN.§ 1800(b)(5) (West 1977)).
29. CAL. CORP. CODE ANN. § 1800 (1977) legislative committee comment.
30. Act of May 26, 1955, ch. 1371, § 1, 1955 N.C. Sess. Laws 1509 (codified as amended at
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-125(a)(4) (1982) and replaced by N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-14-30 (1990)). See
generally Latty, supra note 6, at 448-49 (discussing involuntary dissolution under old Act).
31. Act of May 14, 1973, ch. 469, § 41, 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws 557 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 55-125.1 (1982) and replaced by N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-14-30, 55-14-31 (1990)); R. ROmNSON,
supra note 19, at § 29-12.
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Corporation Act Drafting Committee followed the suggestions of Professor Er-
nest L. Folk, 111.32 Professor Folk stated: "[D]issolution is not a wholly satis-
factory remedy. Since it does irrevocably end a once viable concern which
might have been revived if the stalemate could have been broken, it entails the
permanent loss of going-concern values."'33 The resulting section 55-125.134 fol-
lowed almost verbatim a provision in the South Carolina Business Corporation
Act.35
In Meiselman v. Meiselman36 the North Carolina Supreme Court inter-
preted both section 55-125(a)(4) and section 55-125.1. Meiselman involved the
typical close corporation control problem: a family-owned corporation with
family-member owners who could not reconcile their differences.37 Between
1951 and 1971, Mr. Meiselman, founder of several real estate and entertainment
corporations, transferred stock in these corporations to his two sons, Ira and
Michael. 38 These transfers gave Ira approximately seventy percent of the shares
in the family corporations and Michael the remaining thirty percent. 39 Ira and
Michael both worked for the family corporations, but their relationship was not
harmonious. 4°
In 1973, Ira formed Republic Management Corporation to serve as a man-
agement and cost allocation center for the entire family operation.41 Ira, as sole
shareholder of Republic Management, enjoyed the exclusive benefit of the profits
garnered from Republic's dealings with the family operation.42 Michael brought
a shareholder derivative suit claiming that Ira's sole ownership of Republic
Management constituted a breach of fiduciary duty owed to the family corpora-
tions.43 In response, Ira fired Michael from the family corporations and termi-
32. Folk, Revisiting the North Carolina Corporation Law: The Robinson Treatise Reviewed and
the Statute Reconsidered, 43 N.C.L. REv. 768, 864-71 (1965). Professor Folk argued that dissolu-
tion is such a severe measure that many courts will refrain from using it, leaving the minority share-
holder's situation unchanged. Id. at 865. He proposed three alternative measures: the appointing of
a provisional director, the compulsory buy-out of the minority shareholder's shares, and "Section
210 relief." Id. at 866-71. Section 210 of the English Companies Act enabled the courts to exercise
broad power to grant relief when dissolution was appropriate except that it would prejudice some
group of shareholders. Id. at 870. For example, under the act, courts could "with a view to bringing
to an end the matters complained of, make such order as it thinks fit.... regulating the conduct of
the company's affairs in future," including "any alteration in or addition to any company's memo-
randum of articles." -Companies Act, 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, ch. 338, § 210(2), (3).
33. Folk, supra note 32, at 865.
34. For an explanation of § 55-125.1, see supra note 22 and accompanying text.
35. See South Carolina Business Corporation Act of 1962, ch. 847, § 12.23, 1962 S.C. Acts
(codified at S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-21-230 (Law. Co-op. 1977)); see also Meiselman v. Meiselman, 58
N.C. App. 758, 764-65, 295 S.E.2d 249, 254 (1982), modified, 309 N.C. 279, 307 S.E.2d 551 (1983).
36. 309 N.C. 279, 307 S.E.2d 551 (1983).
37. Id. at 281-87, 307 S.E.2d at 553-56.
38. Id. at 282, 307 S.E.2d at 553.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 282-87, 307 S.E.2d at 553-56. Michael contended that he had been systematically
discouraged from contributing to the business, id. at 285, 307 S.E.2d at 555, while Ira characterized
his brother as suffering from "crippling mental disorders." Id. at 287, 307 S.E.2d at 556,
41. Id. at 283-84, 307 S.E.2d at 554-55.
42. Id.
43. Id. The opinion does not discuss this claim, but apparently it is based upon the taking of a
corporate opportunity. The corporate opportunity doctrine provides that "'a corporate fiduciary
may not appropriate to himself an opportunity that rightfully belongs to his corporation.'" Id. at
1112 [Vol. 68
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nated Michael's insurance policies, credit cards, and profit-sharing plan, and
called due all notes that Michael owed to the corporation. 44
Michael again filed suit against Ira and the family corporations, seeking
involuntary dissolution of the corporations under section 55-125(a)(4), or such
equitable relief as was reasonably necessary to protect Michael's rights and inter-
ests under section 55-125.1. 45 The trial court denied relief, but the North Caro-
lina Court of Appeals reversed.46 The court of appeals interpreted section 55-
125(a)(4) to authorize liquidation when the complaining shareholder has shown
that "basic fairness" compels dissolution.47 The court of appeals also concluded
that the complaining shareholder does not have to show "bad faith, mismanage-
ment or wrongful conduct, but only real harm."'48
The North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's ruling,
but disagreed with its reasoning.49 The supreme court held that section 55-
125(a)(4) allows the trial court to dissolve a corporation whenever necessary to
protect a shareholder's "reasonable expectations." 50 The supreme court stated
that, in a suit brought under section 55-125(a)(4), a trial court is required: "(1)
to define the 'rights or interests' the complaining shareholder has in the corpora-
tion; and (2) to determine whether some form of relief is 'reasonably necessary'
for the protection of those 'rights or interests.' "51
In Meiselman the court established four requirements that the plaintiff
must prove to obtain relief under the "reasonable expectations" test.52 First, the
complaining shareholder must prove that "he had one or more substantial rea-
sonable expectations known or assumed by the other participants. 5 3
307, 307 S.E.2d at 568 (quoting Note, Corporate Opportunity and Corporate Competition: A Double-
Barreled Theory of Fiduciary Liability, 10 HOFrRA L. REv. 1193, 1193 (1982)).
44. Id. at 283, 307 S.E.2d at 554. Actions, like Ira's, that reduce the participation or powers of
a minority shareholder, diminish his claim on earnings or assets, or otherwise deny him business
income or advantages are known as a minority shareholder "squeeze-out." O'NEAL's OPPRESSION
OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS, supra note 8, at § 1.01.
45. Meiselman, 309 N.C. at 287, 307 S.E.2d at 556. For an explanation of these remedies, see
supra note 22 and accompanying text.
46. Meiselman v. Meiselman, 58 N.C. App. 758, 776, 295 S.E.2d 249, 260 (1982), modified, 309
N.C. 279, 307 S.E.2d 551 (1983).
47. Id. at 766, 295 S.E.2d at 255.
48. Id. The court interpreted § 55-125(a)(4) to authorize liquidation when it is necessary for
the protection of the complaining shareholder. Id. The complaining shareholder is not required to
show "oppression" by the majority shareholder, but must show only that basic "fairness" compels
dissolution. Id.; see also infra notes 85-89 and accompanying text (old Act did not require oppres-
sive conduct on the part of the majority shareholder, but only infringement of minority shareholder's
rights).
49. Meiselman, 309 N.C. at 298, 307 S.E.2d at 563.
50. Id. at 299, 307 S.E.2d at 563.
51. Id. at 301, 307 S.E.2d at 564.
52. Id. The court held that the reference to "rights and interests of the complaining share-
holder" in § 125(a)(4) included the "reasonable expectations" the complaining shareholder has in
the corporation. Id.
53. Id. The court stated:
These "reasonable expectations" are to be ascertained by examining the entire history of
the participants' relationship. That history will include the "reasonable expectations" cre-
ated at the inception of the participants' relationship; those "reasonable expectations" as
altered over time; and the "reasonable expectations" which develop as the participants
engage in a course of dealing in conducting the affairs of the corporation. The interests and
1990] 1113
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The key is "reasonable." In order for plaintiff's expectations to be
reasonable, they must be known to or assumed by the other sharehold-
ers and concurred in by them. Privately held expectations which are
not made known to the other participants are not "reasonable." Only
expectations embodied in understandings, express or implied, among
the participants should be recognized by the court.5 4
Under Meiselman, a shareholder's reasonable expectations are determined
through a case-by-case examination of the entire history of the shareholder's
relationship with the corporation.55 These reasonable expectations may include
the shareholder's expectation that he will be employed by the company or par-
ticipate in the management of the business.5 6 The minority shareholder should
set forth these reasonable expectations expressly in a well-drafted written agree-
ment;5 7 however, the Meiselman court noted that the minority shareholder may
lack sufficient bargaining power to force the majority to agree to terms that
would allow him to protect his interest.5 8 For this reason, the Meiselman reason-
able-expectations test allows the court to recognize an implied understanding
among the participants.59
The second requirement for a minority shareholder to obtain relief under
Meiselman is a showing that his reasonable expectations have been frustrated.60
Third, the minority shareholder must show that "the frustration was without
fault of plaintiff and was in large part beyond his control."'6 1 Finally, the share-
holder must show that "under all of the circumstances of the case, plaintiff is
entitled to some form of equitable relief."'62
In addition to voicing the reasonable expectations test, the Meiselman court
views of the other participants must be considered in determining "reasonable
expectations."
Id. at 298, 307 S.E.2d at 563.
54. Id.; see also, Note, supra note 24, at 1016 (minority shareholder must bolster reasonable
expectations with an express or implied understanding "akin to a shareholder's agreement").
55. Meiselman, 309 N.C. at 299, 307 S.E.2d at 563. The trial court must examine the rights
and interests of each particular case because § 55-125(a)(4) refers to the rights and interests of the
complaining shareholder, not to the rights and interests of shareholders in general. Id. Only sub-
stantial expectations should be considered, and this again is determined on a case-by-case basis. Id.
56. Id. at 289, 307 S.E.2d at 558.
57. See Blount v. Taft, 295 N.C. 472, 488, 246 S.E.2d 763, 773 (1978). The court in Blount
stated: "[m]inority shareholders who would have protection greater than that afforded by Chapter
55 of the General Statutes and the judicial doctrines prohibiting breach of a fiduciary relationship
must secure it themselves in the form of a 'well drawn' shareholder's agreement." Id. The Blount
opinion could be read to contradict Meiselman's recognition of implied shareholder agreements. See
supra note 54 and accompanying text for an explanation of Meiselman's recognition of implied
shareholder agreements.
58. Meiselman, 309 N.C. at 291, 307 S.E.2d at 558.
59. Id. at 301, 307 S.E.2d at 564.
60. Id.
61. Id. Although the court did not elaborate on this requirement, in a similar situation, a New
Jersey court denied relief to a principal shareholder's son, whose employment the corporation had
terminated, because the son performed his managerial functions unsatisfactorily. Exadaktilos v.
Cinnaminson Realty Co., 167 N.J. Super. 141, 155, 400 A.2d 554, 561 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1979),
aff'd, 173 N.J. Super. 559, 414 A.2d 994 (Super. Ct. App. Div.), cert. denied, 85 N.J. 112, 425 A.2d
273 (1980).
62. Meiselman, 309 N.C. at 301, 307 S.E.2d at 564.
1114 [Vol. 68
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held that a trial court must read sections 55-125(a)(4) and 55-125.1 together.63
The court stated that when an action is brought under section 55-125(a)(4), the
trial court must examine all of the following possibilities:
(1) whether, under N.C.G.S. § 55-125(a)(4), liquidation is reasonably
necessary; (2) whether, under N.C.G.S. § 55-125. 1(a)(1)-(4), any of the
four listed alternatives are more appropriate than liquidation; (3)
whether, under N.C.G.S. § 55-125. 1(b) any other "alternative" relief is
more appropriate than dissolution; or (4) whether, under N.C.G.S.
§ 55-125.1(b), any other "alternative" relief, but not dissolution, is
appropriate. 64
The supreme court stated that for a trial court to order a remedy under sections
55-125(a)(4) and 55-125.1, "it must only be 'established' under N.C.G.S. § 55-
125(a)(4) that relief of some kind, and not just liquidation, is 'reasonably neces-
sary' for the protection of the complaining shareholder's 'rights and inter-
ests.' "65 Thus, section 55-125(a)(4) provided relief even when dissolution was
not appropriate.
66
In Lowder v. All Star Mills, Inc.67 the North Carolina Court of Appeals
upheld the trial court's order of corporate dissolution under section 55-125(a)(4)
using the Meiselman reasonable expectations test. The appellate court found
that one minority shareholder of a close corporation had a reasonable expecta-
tion that he would have continued employment with a position and compensa-
tion reasonably related to his training, experience, and ownership in the
companies.68 In addition, the minority shareholders had expectations that the
corporation would be managed by the controlling officer in accordance with his
fiduciary obligations and the applicable law, that their equity in the companies
would not be diluted by usurpation of corporate opportunities or diversion of
corporate assets to other companies, and that they would have the opportunity
to "realize on the value of their equity in the companies."' 69 The appellate court
upheld the dissolution, repeating the trial court's finding that the majority share-
63. Id. The court reasoned that the two statutes must be read together because, although § 55-
125(a)(4) suggests that liquidation is the only relief that may be given if a remedy is "reasonably
necessary" for the protection of the minority shareholder, § 55-125.1 gives the court the power to
order alternative forms of relief. Id. Therefore, under the Meiselman test, in order for a com-
plaining shareholder to obtain relief, she need prove only that she is entitled to some form of equita-
ble relief, not that she is entitled to dissolution. Id. To hold otherwise would be to deny the
existence of § 55-125.1. Id.
64. Id. at 300-01, 307 S.E.2d at 564.
65. Id. at 301, 307 S.E.2d at 564. Justice Martin filed a concurring opinion, joined by Chief
Justice Branch and Justice Copeland. Id. at 314, 307 S.E.2d at 571 (Martin, J., concurring in the
result). Justice Martin stated that "the interests of the other shareholders must be... balanced...
in determining whether to grant relief and, if so, the nature, extent and method of relief." Id. at 315,
307 S.E.2d at 572 (Martin, J., concurring in the result). Justice Martin asserted that the court
should consider several other factors: whether the minority shareholder has pursued all other avail-
able statutory means for relief; whether the plaintiff has acted equitably; the effect of granting relief
upon the corporation; and whether the plaintiff's condition was a result of oppression by the other
shareholders. Id. at 315-17, 307 S.E.2d at 571-72 (Martin, J., concurring in the result).
66. Id. at 301, 307 S.E.2d at 564.
67. 75 N.C. App. 233, 330 S.E.2d 649, disc. rev. denied, 314 N.C. 541, 335 S.E.2d 19 (1985).
68. Id. at 243, 330 S.E.2d at 656.
69. Id.
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holders would align themselves in opposition to the minority shareholders,
"making it difficult, if not impossible," for the minority shareholders to realize
their reasonable expectations in the future.70
The new North Carolina Business Corporation Act was adopted six years
after the Meiselman ruling.71 The new Act resulted from the feeling within the
general assembly that North Carolina had an "anachronistic" corporation act.
72
This feeling apparently stemmed from the fact that North Carolina had not
amended its corporation act amid the national trend toward takeovers, mergers,
and buy-outs, while many neighboring states, including Tennessee, South Caro-
lina, and Virginia had enacted the revised Model Business Corporation Act.7 3
Thus, the North Carolina corporation act was unsatisfactory because of its age
as well as its uniqueness. 74
To cure the age and uniqueness of the North Carolina statute, both the
North Carolina Corporate Law Study Commission and the Business Corpora-
tion Act Drafting Committee relied on, and attempted to adopt, the revised
Model Business Corporation Act. 75 Because both the Drafting Committee and
the Study Commission concluded that the structure of the revised Model Busi-
ness Corporation Act was superior to North Carolina's existing Chapter 55, the
committee generally did not make changes for stylistic purposes. 76 The drafters
compared each provision of the existing North Carolina statute with the corre-
sponding revised Model Business Corporation Act provision, and variations of
the Model Business Corporation Act enacted by Tennessee,7 7 South Carolina,78
and Virginia, 79 as well as relevant provisions from the Delaware8 ° and New
York s ' corporate statutes. 8
2
70. Id. at 244, 330 S.E.2d at 656.
71. Act of June 8, 1989, ch. 265, 1989 N.C. Sess. Laws-, (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. Ch. 55
(1990)).
72. CORPORATE LAW STUDY COMMISSION, REPORT TO THE 1988 GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF
NORTH CAROLINA 3 (1989) [hereinafter COMMISSION REPORT]. The General Assembly established
the Corporate Law Study Commission by House Bill 1409 and Senate Bill 950, enacted as Part
XIIIA of Chapter 873 of the 1987 Session Laws. Id. at 1. The commission consisted of eight mem-
bers: three members of the House, three members of the Senate, and two public members. Id. The
Corporate Law Study Commission focused on the substantive changes and policy decisions as set
forth in the revision of the North Carolina Business Corporation Act proposed by the General Stat-
utes Commission together with the Business Corporation Act Drafting Committee. Id. at 2.
73. Id. at 3; see infra notes 77-81 (citations to other state statutes mentioned by commission).
The commission stated that the old North Carolina Business Corporation Act had many uncommon
provisions that were well-intended at the time of enactment, but were outdated at the time of the
study. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 72, at 3.
74. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 72, at 3. The commission report stated that "[t]he cur-
rent climate dictates that North Carolina shed that [anachronistic] image and be recognized for
having a modern and finely-tuned statutory scheme governing business corporations." Id.
75. Id. at 4.
76. Id. The Report stated: "There was a consensus [among committee members] that the
structure of the MBCA [revised Model Business Corporation Act] was superior to existing Chapter
55." Id.
77. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-24-301(2)(B) (1988).
78. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 33-1-10 to 33-39-640 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
79. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-604 to 13.1-800 (1989).
80. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 (1983).
81. See N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§ I to 1533 (McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1990).
82. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 72, at 4. Alternative provisions were drafted and re-
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During the drafting and adoption process, the language of the proposed
judicial dissolution section, North Carolina General Statutes section 55-14-30,
was changed several times. The language contained in the drafting committee's
initial version, introduced to the Senate on February 2, 1989, followed the re-
vised Model Business Corporation Act verbatim. 83 The pertinent parts of the
drafting committee's initial version stated:
55-14-30 GROUNDS FOR JUDICIAL DISSOLUTION.
The superior court may dissolve a corporation:
(2) In a proceeding by a shareholder if it is established that ... (ii)
the directors or those in control of the corporation have acted, are
acting, or will act in a manner that is illegal, oppressive, or fraudulent
... (iv) the corporate assets are being misapplied or wasted .... 84
The drafting committee's version, like the corporate statutes of most states,
followed the position of the revised Model Business Corporation Act and fo-
cused on "illegal, oppressive, or fraudulent" actions of the majority share-
holder.8 5 The old North Carolina dissolution section focused on the
infringement of the rights and interests of the minority shareholder and did not
require any illegal, oppressive, or fraudulent conduct on the part of the majority
shareholder.8 6 In interpreting statutes following the revised Model Business
Corporation Act's "illegal, oppressive, or fraudulent" language, courts have re-
quired wrongful conduct by the majority shareholders. 87 Thus, the "majority
oppression" statutes concentrate on the conduct of the majority shareholders,
while under the Meiselman test, the trial court is to concentrate on the rights or
viewed. The Drafting committee retained the substance and, in some instances, the form of existing
North Carolina provisions when they had "served the State well." Id.
83. S. DRS4536, 139th N.C. Gen. Assembly (1989).
84. Id.
85. See O'NEAL's CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note 7, ch. 9, § 9.29, at 131; see, eg., GA.
CODE ANN. § 14-2-940(a) (1988), ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, para. 12.50(b)(2) (Smith-Hurd 1985),
WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 23A.28.170 (1969).
86. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
87. See Notzke v. Art Gallery, Inc., 84 Ill. App. 3d 294, 299, 405 N.E.2d 839, 843 (1980)
(defendants' conspiratorial action depriving plaintiff-shareholder of his share of corporate control
and his managerial employment coupled with irregular equity transfers constituted "oppressive con-
duct"); Compton v. Paul K. Harding Realty Co., 6 Ill. App. 3d 488, 499, 285 N.E.2d 574, 581
(1972) (failure to call meetings of the board of directors, failure to consult with the plaintiff, and
reacting to the plaintiff's requests in a lackadaisical manner constituted oppressive conduct); Ski
Roundtop, Inc. v. Hall, 202 Mont. 260, 277, 658 P.2d 1071, 1080 (1983) ("oppression" suggests "a
visible departure from the standards of fair dealing and a violation of fair play on which every
shareholder who entrusts his money to a corporation is entitled to rely"); Baker v. Commercial Body
Builders, 264 Or. 614, 637, 507 P.2d 387, 397 (1973) (conduct of the directors preventing the plain-
tiffs from examining corporate records and failing to notify plaintiffs of meetings was oppressive
conduct). But see Lynch v. Buchanan, 37 Md. App. 413, 377 A.2d 592, 596-97 (1977) (corporate
loans with interest to majority shareholder, monetary bonuses paid to the majority shareholder for
overtime services rendered, and large contributions to the corporate pension and profit-sharing plans
of several employees after the minority shareholder left did not constitute majority oppression); Fix
v. Fix Material Co., 538 S.W.2d 351, 358-360 (Mo. App. 1976) (long-term management contract
with majority shareholders, failure of majority shareholder to attend special meetings called by the
minority shareholder, heavy losses arising from the sale of corporate assets, failure to provide
monthly financial statements, and salary increases to majority shareholders did not constitute major-
ity oppression); Iwasaki v Iwasaki Bros., Inc., 58 Or. App. 543, 547-49, 649 P.2d 598, 601-02 (1982)
(failure to declare dividends, payments of excessive nature, removal of plaintiff/shareholder from the
board of directors by vote, and corporate gifts to a director did not constitute majority oppression).
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interests the complaining shareholder has in the corporation and whether those
rights and interests are in need of protection.8 8 In interpreting the word "op-
pressive" in the oppressive conduct requirement, most states have found that
"[tihe word does not necessarily savor of fraud and even the absence of misman-
agement or misapplication of assets does not prevent a finding." 89
The North Carolina Business Corporation Act Drafting Committee decided
to delete the "illegal, oppressive, or fraudulent" language of the revised Model
Business Corporation Act contained in its initial version, and in its place substi-
tuted language from the old dissolution section: that "liquidation is reasonably
necessary for the protection of the rights or interests of the complaining share-
holder." 90 The committee redrafted section 55-14-30(2)(ii) to include the lan-
guage of former section 55-125(a)(4) to reflect that courts should employ a
balancing test when deciding whether to order dissolution.91 In addition, the
committee preferred to retain the language of section 55-125(a)(4) over the lan-
guage of section 14-30(2)(ii) of the revised Business Corporation Act "because
courts in other states appear[ed] to be employing so broad a definition of 'op-
pressive' that its language now appears more permissive than North Carolina's
present statute [section 55-125(a)(4)]." 92
Had the drafting committee's initial version been enacted, the use of the
revised Model Business Corporation Act's "illegal, oppressive, or fraudulent
conduct" standard might not have reduced the judicial protection afforded a
minority shareholder. The New York Court of Appeals, in defining the scope of
"oppressive," has said: "Given the nature of close corporations and the reme-
dial purpose of the statute, this court holds that utilizing a complaining share-
holder's 'reasonable expectations' as a means of identifying and measuring
88. Meiselman, 309 N.C. at 306, 307 S.E.2d at 562; see supra text accompanying note 51.
89. Compton, 6 Ii. App. at 499, 285 N.E.2d at 581 ("oppression" does not have an "essential
inference of imminent disaster, but can contemplate a continuing course of conduct"); see also cases
cited supra note 87.
90. See Business Corporation Act Drafting Committee Minutes at 11-12 (Jan. 18, 1988). The
Judiciary II Committee version contained the language "rights and interests of the complaining
shareholder" of § 55-125(a)(4). S. 280, Judiciary II Committee Substitute, adopted May 3, 1989,
General Assembly of N.C., (1989). The pertinent part of the bill reads "The superior court may
dissolve a corporation... [i]n a pfoceeding by a shareholder if it is established that... (ii) liquida-
tion is reasonably necessary for the protection of the rights or interests of the complaining share-
holder... (iv) the corporate assets are being misapplied or wasted." Id.
91. Business Corporation Drafting Committee Minutes, supra note 90, at 12. Russell M.
Robinson, chairman of the Drafting Committee, proposed the substitution, stating that "he liked the
use of the word 'reasonably' in the present statute; he was of the opinion that a balancing test should
be employed." Id. at 11; see Meiselman, 309 N.C. at 297, 307 S.E.2d at 562 (quoting Henry George
& Sons, Inc. v. Cooper-George, Inc., 95 Wash. 2d 944, 952, 632 P.2d 512, 516-17 (1981)) (the
question of whether or not to grant relief to the complaining shareholder "is essentially one for
resolution through the familiar balancing process and flexible remedial resources of courts of eq-
uity").
The committee noted that South Carolina had added the phrase "or unfairly prejudicial either
to the corporation or to any shareholder (whether in his capacity as a shareholder, director, or officer
of the corporation)" to the language of 14-30(2)(ii) of the revised Business Corporation Act. Busi-
ness Corporation Drafting Committee Minutes, supra note 90, at 12; see S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-21-
150(a)(4)(B) (Law. Co-op. 1976).
92. Business Corporation Drafting Committee Minutes, supra note 90, at 12.
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conduct alleged to be oppressive is appropriate. '93 The North Dakota Supreme
Court has ruled that oppressive conduct could be found when the minority
shareholders' reasonable expectations were frustrated.94
The change back to the "rights and interests of the complaining share-
holder" language, however, was made and contained in the Judiciary II Com-
mittee substitute ratified by the general assembly on May 3, 1989.95 The ratified
version also included the revised Model Business Corporation Act language that
allows dissolution when "the corporate assets are being misapplied or wasted."'96
The other dissolution provisions of the new Act are carried over from the old
Act.97 The entire general assembly ratified the Judiciary II Committee's version
of section 55-14-30 as part of the new Act on June 6, 1989.98
Including the language "liquidation is reasonably necessary for the protec-
tion of the rights or interests of the complaining shareholder" in the new Act
constitutes clear evidence of legislative intent to maintain the existing Meiselman
standard. 99 That the drafting committee revised its initial version containing the
"oppressive or fraudulent" language of the revised Model Business Corporation
Act highlights the legislative intent to maintain the Meiselman standard. As a
result, minority shareholders still will have relief based on the reasonable expec-
tations test voiced in Meiselman.100
93. In re Kemp & Beatley, Inc., 64 N.Y.2d 63, 73, 473 N.E.2d 1173, 1179 (1984).
94. See Balvik v. Sylvester, 411 N.W.2d 383, 387-88 (N.D. 1987).
95. S. 280, Judiciary II Committee Substitute, adopted May 3, 1989, General Assembly of N.C.
The pertinent part of the bill states: "The superior court may dissolve a corporation ... [i]n a
proceeding by a shareholder if it is established that... (ii) liquidation is reasonably necessary for the
protection of the rights or interests of the complaining shareholder .... ." Id.
96. Id. The pertinent part of the bill states, "The court may dissolve a corporation... [i]n a
proceeding by a shareholder if it is established that... (iv) the corporate assets are being misapplied
or wasted." Id. In Meiselman, the North Carolina Supreme Court recognized that shareholders are
protected from usurpation of corporate opportunities and diversion of corporate assets by a corpo-
rate fiduciary. Meiselman v. Meiselman, 309 N.C. 279, 307, 307 S.E.2d 551, 567 (1983) (quoting
Brite v. Penny, 157 N.C. 110, 115, 72 S.E.2d 964, 966 (1911)) ("The law would not permit him [a
corporate officer] to act in any such double capacity to appropriate business for himself belonging
legitimately to his corporation and to reap the profits of it."); see also Lowder v. All Star Mills, Inc.,
75 N.C. App. 233, 240, 330 S.E.2d 649, 654, cert denied, 314 N.C. 541, 335 S.E.2d 19 (1985).
97. Compare Act of May 26, 1955, ch. 1371, § 55-125, 1955 N.C. Sess. Laws 1509 (codified as
amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-125(a) (1982)) with N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-14-30(b) (1990).
98. Act of June 6, 1989, ch. 265 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-14-30 (1990)). The provi-
sions of § 55-125.1 were not included in the new Act. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-14-30, 55-14-31
(1990).
99. The Drafting Committee's initial version contained the "illegal, fraudulent, or oppressive"
language of the revised Model Business Corporation Act, while the Committee substitute adopted on
May 3, 1989 contained the language of old § 55-125(a)(4). The old statute provided that the court
has the power to liquidate the corporation when it is established that "[iliquidation is reasonably
necessary for the protection of the rights or interests of the complaining shareholder." Act of May
26, 1955, ch. 1371, 1955 N.C. Seas. Laws 1509 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-
125(a)(4) (1982) and replaced by N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-14-30 (1990)). The new statute provides the
same: that the court shall have the power to dissolve the corporation when it is established that
"liquidation is reasonably necessary for the protection of the rights or interests of the complaining
shareholder." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-14-30(2)(ii) (1990) (for the purposes of the statute "dissolve" is
the same as "liquidate").
100. The court explained that:
For plaintiff to obtain relief under the expectations' analysis, he must prove that (I) he had
one or more substantial reasonable expectations known or assumed by the other partici-
pants; (2) the expectation has been frustrated; (3) the frustration was without fault of plain-
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The final part of the Meiselman test-the requirement that the shareholder
show that he "is entitled to some form of equitable relief "10 1-will change
under the new Act, however. A literal reading of the old dissolution section
would have suggested that dissolution is the only relief that the trial court may
give if judicial relief is "reasonably necessary" for the protection of the com-
plaining shareholder's "rights and interests".102 Under the Meiselman ruling,
however, the trial court would read the dissolution and the alternative relief
sections together, allowing the court to grant relief under section 55-125.1 when
some kind of relief, but not dissolution, was appropriate.10 3 Because the alterna-
tive discretionary relief provisions of section 55-125.1104 are not available in the
new Act,105 courts are empowered only to order dissolution as a remedy, and so
will read the fourth part of the Meiselman reasonable expectations test as:
"Under all of the circumstances of the case, plaintiff is entitled to dissolution."
To determine whether the judicial power to render the discretionary relief
measures contained in section 55-125.1,106 the old alternative relief section, ex-
ists after July 1990, courts will examine the legislative intent to leave this provi-
sion out of the new statute.10 7 The North Carolina legislature did intend to
eliminate the courts' statutory power to order the relief measures listed in sec-
tion 55-125.1. A summary of the proposed new North Carolina Business Corpo-
rations Act attached as part of the May 23, 1989, Minutes of the House
Subcommittee on Courts and Administrative Hearings' 08 stated that "[t]he al-
ternative remedies presently authorized by G.S. 55-125.1 will be replaced by a
simpler provision that expressly permits the corporation to buy out the minority
shareholder at a judicially determined fair value if involuntary dissolution is or-
tiff and was in large part beyond his control; and (4) under all of the circumstances of the
case, plaintiff is entitled to some form of equitable relief.
Meiselman v. Meiselnan, 309 N.C. 279, 301, 307 S.E.2d 551, 564 (1983); see supra text accompany-
ing notes 52-66. Note that this standard has also been used where the applicable statute contains the
majority shareholder oppressive conduct standard of the revised Model Business Corporation Act.
See supra text accompanying notes 92-94.
101. Meiselman, 309 N.C. at 301, 307 S.E.2d at 564.
102. Id. at 300, 307 S.E.2d at 563.
103. Id. The court stated that "[tihis statute [section 55-125(a)(4)] . . . is not to be read in
isolation. Under N.C.G.S. § 55-125.1, the trial court is given the power to order alternative forms of
relief for actions brought under N.C.G.S. § 55-125(a)." Id.
104. See Act of May 14, 1973, ch. 469, § 41, 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws 557 (codified at N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 55-125.1 (1982) and replaced by N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-14-30, 55-14-31 (1990)).
105. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-14-30, 31 (1990); see infra text accompanying notes 106-33. Courts
are less likely to grant dissolution than the less severe relief measures available in section 55-125.1.
See infra text accompanying notes 143-49.
Section 55-14-31 gives the court discretion to issue injunctions, appoint receivers, and take other
actions in a judicial dissolution, but this power is limited to the purpose of protecting the corporate
assets and ongoing business of the corporation during dissolution. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-14-31(c)
(1990).
106. Act of May 14, 1973, ch. 469, 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws 557 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-
125.1 (1982) and replaced by N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-14-30, 55-14-31 (1990)).
107. State v. Lance, 244 N.C. 455, 458, 94 S.E.2d 335, 338 (1956) ("the intent of the lawmaking
body gives the statute its vital force").
108. The Judiciary II Committee's version of the proposed act was referred to the Subcommittee




dered."' 109 In addition, the North Carolina Commentary to section 55-14-31
states that:
Under former G.S. 55-125.1, the court was authorized to grant certain
forms of relief (ag., mandatory purchase of shares) as an alternative to
dissolution when dissolution was not appropriate. The Model Act
does not authorize alternative relief. This section varies from the
Model Act by adding Subsection (d), which authorizes alternative re-
lief in only one instance and then only if the court determines that
dissolution would be appropriate and if the corporation elects such al-
ternative relief. 110
This commentary establishes that the legislature intended to eliminate the alter-
native relief measures of the old Act by omitting the old alternative remedy
section.
This legislative intent is consistent with viewing the new dissolution section
as analogous to an amendment, which can be fairly done because the new disso-
lution section replaces the dissolution sections of the old Act.111 In construing
an amendatory statute, the North Carolina courts follow a presumption that
"the legislature intended either (a) to change the substance of the original act, or
(b) to clarify the meaning of it.-'112 This presumption maintains that the legisla-
ture intended to change the original Act by creating a new right or withdrawing
an existing right.1 13 Therefore, any material change in the original act presuma-
bly changes the existing legal rights.' 14 Under this presumption, a court should
presume that the elimination of the alternative relief measures was intended to
change existing legal rights. The obvious conclusion is that the alternative relief
measures are no longer available because the section authorizing these measures
has been eliminated.
Additionally, the intentions of the drafting committee of the new North
Carolina Business Corporation Act fit the conclusion that the legislature pur-
posefully withdrew the statutory power to order the equitable measures con-
tained in the old alternative remedy section. The committee decided not to
carry forward section 55-125.1(1)-(3) because it believed these sections were un-
desirable.1 Is In excluding section 125.1(1)-(2)116 from the new Act, the commit-
tee acted on its feeling that courts should not be involved in the internal affairs
109. Minutes, North Carolina House Subcommittee on Court and Administrative Hearings,
May 23, 1989 at 7.
110. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-14-31 (1990), N.C. Comment.
I11. Id. §§ 55-14-30 to -31 (1990), N.C. Comment.
112. Childers v. Parker's, Inc., 274 N.C. 256, 260, 162 S.E.2d 481, 483 (1968).
113. Id. The legislature is presumed to know the prior judicial construction of the original act
and an amendment to the original act indicates that a different interpretation should be given to the
amendment. N. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 22-30 (4th ed. 1986). This
is a rule unique to amendments or other acts purporting to change the existing statutory law. Id.
114. N. SINGER, supra note 113, at § 22-30. Note, however, that although courts conclude that
every amendment has a purpose, "the presumption that a departure from the old law was intended
[by the enacting of an amendment] is merely an aid to interpretation-not an absolute rule."
Childers, 274 N.C. at 260, 162 S.E.2d at 484.
115. Business Corporation Act Drafting Committee Minutes at 11 (January 18, 1988).
116. Act of May 14, 1973, ch. 469, 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws 557 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-
125.1(1)-(2) (1982) and replaced by N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-14-30, 55-14-31 (1990)).
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of a corporation. 117 Section 55-125.1(1)-(2) gave courts the power to order the
cancellation or alteration of any charter or by-law provision and the power to
order any canceling, altering, or enjoining of any corporate act or resolution. 118
The drafting committee believed that when corporate matters reach a point low
enough to justify judicial interference, dissolution is the appropriate remedy. 119
The committee believed that section 55-125.1(3),120 which allowed courts to en-
join acts of the corporation, shareholders, directors, officers, or other persons
that were illegal, fraudulent, or violated a fiduciary duty, was unnecessary be-
cause such acts could be enjoined without this provision. 12 1
The drafting committee omitted the section 55-125.1 provision for a court-
ordered share buy-out 122 because it believed that a corporate buy-out of the mi-
nority shareholder's shares should be at the option of the majority shareholders
or corporation, not at the discretion of the court. 123 Under the new North Caro-
lina Business Corporation Act, the corporation has the option to buy out the
shares of the complaining shareholder under section 55-14-31(d), 124 which
states:
In any proceeding brought by a shareholder under G.S. 55-14-30(2)(ii)
in which the court determines that dissolution would be appropriate,
the court shall not order dissolution if, after such determination, the
corporation elects to purchase the shares of the complaining share-
holder at their fair value, as determined in accordance with such pro-
cedures as the court may provide. 125
Note, however, that the court may authorize a buy-out only if the court has
determined that dissolution would be appropriate and if the corporation elects
such alternative relief. 126
Despite the clear legislative intent behind the elimination of section 55-
125.1, it can be argued that North Carolina courts might retain some power to
117. Conversation with Thomas Lee Hazen, Professor of Law, The University of North Carolina
at Chapel Hill, North Carolina Business Corporation Drafting Committee Member (October 2,
1989) [hereinafter Conversation].
118. Act of May 14, 1973, ch. 469, 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws 557 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-
125.1(1)-(2) (1982) and replaced by N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-14-30, 55-14-31 (1990)).
119. Conversation, supra note 117.
120. Act of May 14, 1973, ch. 469, 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws 557 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-
125.1(4) (1982) and replaced by N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-14-30, 55-14-31(1990)). Section 55-125.1(4)
provided that a court may issue an order "[d]irecting or prohibiting any act of the corporation or of
shareholders, directors, officers or other persons party to the action."
121. Conversation, supra note 117.
122. Act of May 14, 1973, ch. 469, 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws 557 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-
125.1(4) (1982) and replaced by N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-1430, 55-14-31 (1990)). Section 55-
125.1(4) provides that the court may issue an order "[p]roviding for the purchase at their fair market
value of shares of any shareholder, either by the corporation or by other shareholders, such fair
value to be determined in accordance with such provisions as the court may provide." Id.
123. Conversation, supra note 117.
124. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-14-31(d) (1990). The North Carolina Business Corporation Draft-
ing Committee substituted the court ordered buy-out provision of § 55-125.1 with the optional buy-
out provision of § 55-14-31(d) because the committee wanted to discourage minority shareholders
from bringing petty suits whose only purpose is to obtain forced buy-out of complaining sharehold-
ers' shares. Conversation, supra note 117.




provide alternative relief to dissolution based on the courts' inherent equitable
powers. Courts in states with a statute authorizing involuntary dissolution but
without provisions for alternative relief are divided on whether courts may grant
an alternative remedy based on inherent equitable powers. 127 In some states
where dissolution is the only remedy mentioned in the statute, courts have
granted alternative relief when statutory grounds for dissolution have been
shown but dissolution is too strong a remedy. 128 These courts have emphasized
the severity of dissolution and have reasoned that alternative remedies give the
court relief power appropriate for a wider range of situations. 129 The removal of
the alternative remedies of section 55-125.1 from the new North Carolina Busi-
ness Corporation Act, however, coupled with the legislative intent that these
remedies no longer be available, precludes the application of these remedies
under North Carolina's new Act.
In White v. Perkins 130 the Virginia Supreme Court construed a provision of
the Virginia Code13 1 empowering the court, upon finding majority oppression,
to decree dissolution or appoint a custodian. Interpreting the statute, the court
found that the legislature intended these two remedies to be exclusive and that it
could not grant alternative relief under the statute. 132 By eliminating the alter-
native relief measures of the old alternative remedy section, the North Carolina
General Assembly demonstrated its intent that these measures no longer be
available. Therefore, the relief measures available under the new Act are re-
stricted to dissolution of the corporation, or allowing the corporation to buy out
the minority shareholders at fair value.133
Under the Act, courts will be able to control the corporation indirectly
through receivership. Under section 55-14-32(a) 134 of the new statute, a court in
a proceeding brought to dissolve a corporation will have the power to "appoint
one or more receivers to wind up or liquidate, or to manage, the business and
affairs of the corporation" in a judicial proceeding brought to dissolve the corpo-
127. O'NEAL'S CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note 7, at § 9.37.
128. See, eg., McCauley v. Tom McCauley & Son, Inc., 104 N.M. 523, 527, 724 P.2d 232, 236
(1986). The court, stating that "[a]n order of corporate dissolution is a drastic remedy and should be
utilized sparingly, after consideration of other alternative forms of relief," approved the trial courts's
recognition of the remedies of liquidation, partition and reorganization, or purchase of the minority
shareholder's outstanding shares by the corporation. Id.
129. Id.; see infra text accompanying notes 144-48.
130. 213 Va. 129, 189 S.E.2d 315 (1972).
131. Section 13.1-94 of the Virginia Code provides: "Any court of record, with general equity
jurisdiction... shall have full power to liquidate the assets and business of the corporation... (a) In
an action by a stockholder when it is established: ... (2) That the acts of the directors or those in
control of the corporation are illegal, oppressive or fraudulent." VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-94 (1968)
(repealed 1985).
132. Fhite, 213 Va. at 135, 189 S.E.2d at 320; see also Gruenberg v. Goldmine Plantation Inc.,
360 So. 2d 884, 887 (La. Ct. App. 1978) ("Our substantive law provides for involuntary dissolution
but offers no remedy for the minority shareholder with substantial holdings who is locked out of
control and trapped in a close corporation.").
133. Robinson, THE NENW NORTH CAROLINA BusINESS CORPORATION AcT, NOTES BEARING
INTEREST, North Carolina Bar Association Business Law Section Newsletter, Sept. 1989 at 4. (Rus-
sell M. Robinson II was chairman of the Business Corporation Act Drafting Committee of the
General Statutes Commission, 1985-1989.).
134. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-14-32(a) (1990).
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ration.13 5 Although this provision apparently gives the court some alternative
relief through management of the corporation's internal affairs, the receiver, not
the court, will decide the management issues.1 36
Compared with the old Act, the new North Carolina Business Corporation
Act undeniably constricts the statutory relief available to the minority share-
holder. Although courts will still apply the same basic Meiselman test 137 to
determine whether a complaining shareholder's reasonable expectations have
been frustrated, the new act withdraws the alternative relief measures of the old
Act.1 38 As a result, North Carolina courts have decreased flexibility in tailoring
an appropriate remedy in shareholder disputes. 139
Under the new Act, the trial court's statutory remedies are dissolution and
the optional minority share buy-out. 140 Because dissolution is a more severe
remedy than the alternative remedies available under section 55-125.1, the trial
court will be less likely to order any relief under the new statute than under the
old dissolution statute.
In interpreting the old statute, the Meiselman court stated that, after the
plaintiff had proved that his "reasonable rights and interests" were being contra-
vened, the trial court, "in deciding whether to grant relief, 'must exercise its
equitable discretion, and consider the actual benefit and injury to [all of] the
shareholders resulting from dissolution' or other possible relief.'1 41 The court
went on to say that "[t]he question is essentially one for resolution through the
familiar balancing process and flexible remedial resources of courts of eq-
uity." 142 The court further stated that "[t]o hold otherwise would allow a plain-
tiff to demand at will dissolution of a corporation or a forced buy-out of his
shares or other relief at the expense of the corporation and without regard to the
rights and interests of the other shareholders." 143
Under the new dissolution section, the court has only the power to order
dissolution. In balancing the benefits and injuries to shareholders resulting from
court-ordered relief, the trial court will be less hesitant to order relief under the
new dissolution section than the old dissolution and alternative relief sections
135. Id.
136. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-14-32 (1990). Under § 125.1, the court had the power to cancel,
alter or enjoin by-law and charter provisions, as well as direct or prohibit any act of the corporation,
or of its shareholders, directors, and officers. Act of May 14, 1973, ch. 469, § 41, 1973 N.C. Sess.
Laws 557 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-125.1(1)-(2) (1982) and replaced by N.C. GEN. STAT,
§ 55-14-30 (1990)).
137. See supra notes 102-04 and accompanying text for an explanation of the one modification of
the Meiselman reasonable expectations test under the new Act.
138. In addition, by withdrawing the relief measures available in § 55-125.1, the new Act
changes the Meiselman test, requiring that liquidation, not just relief of some kind, be reasonably
necessary for the protection of the complaining shareholder's rights and interests before courts will
apply the new dissolution statute.
139. O'Neal, The Charlotte Observer, May 20, 1989, § A, at 18.
140. For a discussion of the minority share buy-out, see notes 122-26 and accompanying text.
141. Meiselman v. Meiselman, 309 N.C. 279, 297, 307 S.E.2d 551, 562 (1983) (quoting Henry
George & Sons, Inc. v. Cooper-George, Inc., 95 Wash. 2d 944, 951, 632 P.2d 512, 516 (1981)).
142. Id. (quoting Henry George & Sons, Inc. v. Cooper-George, Inc., 95 Wash. 2d 944, 951, 632
P.2d 512, 516 (1981)).
143. Meiselman, 309 N.C. at 297, 307 S.E.2d at 562.
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because dissolution has such severe consequences. The trial court cannot ignore
the practical consequences that terminating a going business will have on the
corporation's employees, suppliers, and customers.144 These considerations pre-
vent a mechanical application of dissolution.14 5 As Illinois and Nebraska courts
have stated, "the remedy of dissolution is so drastic that it must be invoked with
extreme caution."'146
Professor Earnest L. Folk, III, in proposing alternatives to the dissolution
relief measures contained in section 55-125147 (at the time of writing, section 55-
125.1 had not yet been enacted), stated:
[Dissolution] is thus sufficiently drastic that many courts shrink from
it as court-enforced corporate suicide (or judicial murder) hoping for
the impasse to break-something that can never happen if the enter-
prise dies by court decree. Hence the observable judicial reluctance to
order dissolution, even when statutes give courts that power. Their
discretion as to exercising the power tempts them to withhold it.
Courts may also feel, however incorrectly, that the fighting sharehold-
ers do not in their heart of hearts wish to destroy the enterprise and
will regret it if the act is done.148
Under the new Act, if the trial court decides, after balancing the benefits
and injuries to the shareholders, that dissolution is an appropriate remedy, the
corporation still has the option to redeem the complaining shareholder's shares
at their fair value, as determined in accordance with such procedures as the
court may provide. 14 9 However, this procedure allows the majority shareholder
to take away the minority shareholder's corporate ownership, albeit at a "fair
price." The buy-out may allow the minority to realize the fair value of his
shares, but by nature, it prevents the protection of his reasonable expectations as
an owner.
Professor F. Hodge O'Neal, 150 commenting on the proposed Act which
failed to include the alternative relief measures, stated:
North Carolina led the nation in 1955 by enacting pioneering legisla-
tion to protect people holding minority interests in corporations
against arbitrary and oppressive action and self-dealing by directors
and controlling shareholders. . . Since 1955, these laws have pre-
served an appropriate balance between the majority shareholders' right
to control a corporation and the protection holders of minority inter-
ests in N.C. corporations deserve against the kind of high-handed, un-
144. See Comment, Oppression of Minority Shareholders: A Proposed Model and Suggested Rem-
edies, 47 Miss. L.J. 476,496-97 (1976) (discussing cases and commentary dealing with oppression by
majority shareholders, suggesting a model for determining when dissolution is an appropriate rem-
edy, and examining various types of alternative relief).
145. Id.
146. Polikoff v. Dole & Clark Bldg. Corp, 37 111. App. 2d 29, 36, 184 N.E.2d 792, 795 (1962);
Hockenberger v. Curry, 191 Neb. 404,406, 215 N.W.2d 627, 628 (1974) (quoting Polikoff, at 36, 184
N.E.2d at 795).
147. Folk, supra note 32, at 864.
148. Id. at 865-66.
149. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-14-31(d) (1990).
150. For other commentary by Professor O'Neal, see notes 7-8.
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scrupulous abuse of power that is so widespread throughout the
country.
Fair, balanced business law encourages people to invest in busi-
nesses; on the other hand, law that sets the stage for mistreatment of
investors of course discourages investment. Since World War II, I
have studied corporations and minority shareholder problems-16 of
those years being spent in North Carolina-and I have coauthored two
two-volume treatises dealing with these subjects. I am distressed that a
state which has been a "shining light" may abandon minority share-
holder protection that it pioneered. 151
With the enactment of section 55-14-30 and the elimination of the old alter-
native remedy section, the balance of legal rights between the majority and mi-
nority shareholders of the close corporation in North Carolina has shifted. The
minority shareholders no longer have access to the alternative remedies of sec-
tion 55-125.1 in a squeeze-out situation; North Carolina courts are currently
empowered only to grant dissolution or the buy-out of the minority shareholders
shares at the option of the majority. As a result, the minority shareholder has
less protection against abuse of majority share power; courts are hesitant to or-
der dissolution and the minority share buy-out deprives the minority share-
holder of continued enjoyment in the corporation's future.
ROBERT SAVAGE MCLEAN
151. O'Neal, supra note 139, at 18.
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